Michael Murez

Publications

In J. Smortchkova, K. Dołęga, & Tobias Schlicht (eds.) « What Are Mental Representations ? » Oxford University Press, 2020.

Representational Kinds

avec J. Smortchkova
Michael Murez
Abstract : Many debates in philosophy focus on whether folk or scientific psychological notions pick out cognitive natural kinds. Examples include memory, emotions and concepts. A potentially interesting kind of kind is : kinds of mental representations (as opposed, for example, to kinds of psychological faculties). In this chapter we outline a proposal for a theory of representational kinds in cognitive science. We argue that the explanatory role of representational kinds in scientific (...)

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Klesis 47, 2020

Putnam et McDowell sur les objets de l’introspection

In H. Wagner (ed.) « Lectures de Hilary Putnam »
Michael Murez
https://www.revue-klesis.org/pdf/kl...

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In. R. Goodman, J. Genone & N. Kroll (eds.) « Singular Thought and Mental Files », Oxford University Press, 2020.

The Mental Files Theory of Singular Thought : A Psychological Perspective

avec Joulia Smortchkova & Brent Strickland
Michael Murez
Abstract : We argue that the most ambitious version of the mental files theory of singular thought, according to which mental files are a wide-ranging psychological natural kind underlying all and only singular thinking, is unsupported by the available psychological data. Nevertheless, critical examination of the theory from a psychological perspective opens up promising avenues for research, especially concerning the relationship between our perceptual capacity to individuate and track (...)

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Les Études philosophiques 2019/3 (N°193)

Le fressellianisme face au dilemme de l’accointance

In S. Gandon & D. Perrin (eds.) « Renouveaux de la notion russellienne d’acquaintance »
Michael Murez
Selon le russellianisme, nous avons des pensées singulières faisant directement référence aux objets, fondées sur des relations d’accointance (1^re partie). Selon le frégéanisme, toute pensée est médiatisée par un concept (2^e partie). Le fressellianisme anti-descriptiviste cherche à réconcilier ces thèses apparemment opposées, et à éviter les objections auxquelles chacune s’expose, en postulant des concepts singuliers, individués par des relations d’accointance (3^e partie). Mais le fressellianisme rencontre (...)

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Synthese 2019

Hearing meanings : the revenge of context

avec Luca Gasparri
Michael Murez
According to the perceptual view of language comprehension, listeners typically recover high-level linguistic properties such as utterance meaning without inferential work. The perceptual view is subject to the Objection from Context : since utterance meaning is massively context-sensitive, and context-sensitivity requires cognitive inference, the perceptual view is false. In recent work, Berit Brogaard provides a challenging reply to this objection. She argues that in language comprehension (...)

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Articles ou chapitres publiés dans des ouvrages collectifs

In J. Smortchkova, K. Dołęga, & Tobias Schlicht (eds.) « What Are Mental Representations ? » Oxford University Press, 2020.

Representational Kinds

avec J. Smortchkova
Michael Murez
In. R. Goodman, J. Genone & N. Kroll (eds.) « Singular Thought and Mental Files », Oxford University Press, 2020.

The Mental Files Theory of Singular Thought : A Psychological Perspective

avec Joulia Smortchkova & Brent Strickland
Michael Murez