Synthese 2019
avec Luca Gasparri
jeudi 26 septembre 2019,
According to the perceptual view of language comprehension, listeners typically recover high-level linguistic properties such as utterance meaning without inferential work. The perceptual view is subject to the Objection from Context : since utterance meaning is massively context-sensitive, and context-sensitivity requires cognitive inference, the perceptual view is false. In recent work, Berit Brogaard provides a challenging reply to this objection. She argues that in language comprehension context-sensitivity is typically exercised not through inferences, but rather through top-down perceptual modulations or perceptual learning. This paper provides a complete formulation of the Objection from Context and evaluates Brogaard’s reply to it. Drawing on conceptual considerations and empirical examples, we argue that the exercise of context-sensitivity in language comprehension does, in fact, typically involve inference.
Lien vers la revue : https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-...
Lien vers la prépublication : https://philarchive.org/rec/GASHMT
Maà®tre de conférences.
Philosophie de l’esprit. Philosophie du langage.
Courrier électronique : michael.murez@univ-nantes.fr
In Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann, Andrea Onofri (eds.) « The Fragmented Mind »
Oxford University Press, 2021.
Abstract : Belief fragments and mental files are based on the same idea : that information in people’s minds is compartmentalized rather than lumped all together. While some authors (Cherniak 1986 ; Egan 2008) occasionally describe fragments as ‘mental files,’ philosophers mostly use the two notions differently, though the exact relationship between fragments and files has yet to be examined in detail. This chapter has three main goals. The first is to argue that fragments and files, properly (...)
In J. Smortchkova, K. DoÅ‚Ä™ga, & Tobias Schlicht (eds.) « What Are Mental Representations ? » Oxford University Press, 2020.
avec J. Smortchkova
Abstract : Many debates in philosophy focus on whether folk or scientific psychological notions pick out cognitive natural kinds. Examples include memory, emotions and concepts. A potentially interesting kind of kind is : kinds of mental representations (as opposed, for example, to kinds of psychological faculties). In this chapter we outline a proposal for a theory of representational kinds in cognitive science. We argue that the explanatory role of representational kinds in scientific (...)
Klesis 47, 2020
In H. Wagner (ed.) « Lectures de Hilary Putnam »
https://www.revue-klesis.org/pdf/kl...
In. R. Goodman, J. Genone & N. Kroll (eds.) « Singular Thought and Mental Files », Oxford University Press, 2020.
avec Joulia Smortchkova & Brent Strickland
Abstract : We argue that the most ambitious version of the mental files theory of singular thought, according to which mental files are a wide-ranging psychological natural kind underlying all and only singular thinking, is unsupported by the available psychological data. Nevertheless, critical examination of the theory from a psychological perspective opens up promising avenues for research, especially concerning the relationship between our perceptual capacity to individuate and track (...)
Les à‰tudes philosophiques 2019/3 (N°193)
In S. Gandon & D. Perrin (eds.) « Renouveaux de la notion russellienne d’acquaintance »
Selon le russellianisme, nous avons des pensées singulières faisant directement référence aux objets, fondées sur des relations d’accointance (1re partie). Selon le frégéanisme, toute pensée est médiatisée par un concept (2e partie). Le fressellianisme anti-descriptiviste cherche à réconcilier ces thèses apparemment opposées, et à éviter les objections auxquelles chacune s’expose, en postulant des concepts singuliers, individués par des relations d’accointance (3e partie). Mais le fressellianisme rencontre (...)
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Professeur.
Directeur du département de philosophie.
Maà®tre de conférences.
Professeur.
Allocataire-monitrice.
Maà®tre de conférences. Philosophie ancienne.
Professeur. Directeur du Caphi.
Maà®tresse de conférences
Professeur.
Professeur d’épistémologie et histoire des sciences.
Maà®tre de conférences.
Maà®tre de Conférences HDR
Maà®tre de conférences.
Maà®tre de Conférences. Musique et musicologie.
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