Philosophical Enquiries, numéro 1, juin 2013
Une solution reidienne au problème du critère
jeudi 22 août 2013,
Starting from the consideration of the “principle of the criterion†, according to which “knowledge of the reliability of our intellectual faculties is required to have any knowledge†, the paper shows how the Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid helps us to escape the dead-end into which we are classically supposed to fall if we stick to this principle. Briefly, either we endorse a strict interpretation of this principle, but then we must admit that it is impossible to know anything, or we take on a loose interpretation of the principle, but we face the accusation of allowing an explosion of non-valuable knowledge. The paper argues that Reid’s remarks about the first principles of common sense invite us to formulate an adjusted version of the principle of the criterion, and as a consequence are the appropriate place for a renewed discussion about skepticism and externalism.
Maà®tresse de conférences
Philosophie britannique moderne, philosophie analytique de la connaissance
Courrier électronique : Angélique Thébert
Locke Studies
vol. 22, 2022
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
XIV.2, 2022 (avec M. Bella)
Angélique Thébert
dans « Igitur », vol. 13, n° 1, 2022.
Angélique Thébert
Dans « Extending Hinge Epistemology » (Anthem Studies in Wittgenstein, 2022, edited by C. Sandis & D. Moyal-Sharrock)
Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger
2021/1 (tome 146)
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy
XII-1, 2020 (avec M. Bella)
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
vol. 10 (2), p. 129-155
dans « Les formes historiques du Cogito » (dir. K. S. Ong-van-Cung)
L’héritage cartésien de Locke et Reid sur l’identité personnelle
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